from Southern Africa deserves the attention of the US government, which should be planning for various contingencies, particularly for the 2020s and beyond. The region contains high concentrations of platinum group metals (PGMs), cobalt, manganese, chromium, vanadium, fluorspar, and titanium, and alternative sources are not abundant in other parts of the world. The industries of the United States and its allies depend on the free market for Southern African minerals, and US defense industries depend on these minerals for the manufacture of aircraft, aerospace systems, ships, and high technology components which are important for US national security. By the 2020s, the free market and US national security interests could be adversely affected. The poor infrastructure of the region (electricity, railroads, roads, and skills) means sub-optimal production of minerals, with limited prospects for expanded supply. Less predictable is the impact that Chinese demand-driven intervention and African resource nationalism (mine nationalization, state-owned mining companies, and indigenization) will have on the free market and future flows. In a worst case scenario, resource nationalism will further drive down production and supply, while Chinese monopolization of minerals will dry up free market supply for the United States and its allies in the 2020s and beyond. 6 Thus, this report focuses on resource nationalism and Chinese demand.
The 2010 Research Paper dealt with some of these constraining factors, while the 2011 report provides more depth in the analysis of the impact of resource nationalism and Chinese demand-driven activities. More importantly, this report determines which factors are most important in the short and medium term (e.g. resource nationalism) and in the long run (e.g. Chinese monopolization of strategic minerals). In brief, the range of views among mining experts differed substantially. Many Southern
African mining experts think that infrastructure is the greatest obstacle in the short and medium term. 7 A growing number of experts think that politics and resource nationalism are the greatest problem today and in the medium term. 8 A few thought that Chinese off-take agreements are a growing threat that could become as serious as electricity shortages and infrastructure deficiencies, especially in the medium to long run. 9 Given the range of views, my evaluation is that, in the short term, infrastructure remains the major impediment to sustaining and developing mining in South Africa, and it is a problem in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Zambia, Zimbabwe and Namibia. Resource nationalism is inhibiting further investment and development in South Africa, Zimbabwe, and the DRC. Chinese involvement is already having an impact in the DRC, as well as Zimbabwe and Zambia and may soon do so in Namibia. In South Africa, infrastructure and resource nationalism will be the greatest problems in the short term and the medium term. In the long run, Chinese demand-driven activities will seek to dominate the South African mining industry and minerals and metals markets. For Southern Africa, resource nationalism and demand from China and Asia will become increasingly important in affecting and even threatening the supply of strategic minerals to the United States. A change in US strategy regarding strategic minerals combined with contingency planning and policy measures can mitigate these negative trends.
RESOURCE NATIONALISM
The surge in Southern African resource nationalism over the past decade is a sign of growing populism in response to chronic inequality in the sub-region. Ruling parties, many of which were formerly socialist-oriented liberation movements have made promises of employment and development.
However, they have been unable to deliver on many of their promises, and many leaders are turning to populism in striving to stay in power. Resource nationalism is also a sign of the long-standing divide between African ruling parties and Western and South African mining companies which have been seen as colonialist and capitalist exploiters. Resource nationalism has taken the form of "indigenization"
programs, promising to "trickle down" benefits from local black businessmen who form companies to take over interests in mining operations. However, thus far, results of indigenization have generally been disappointing, with very little trickle down occurring.
In several countries, state mining companies have been created or revived and provided with competitive advantages. At times, they have been used to mine non-profitable but strategic minerals and to create jobs. Nationalization of mines has been mooted in several countries, with the promise of job creations and social benefits. However, Zambia and the DRC suffered through failed mine nationalization experiments in the 1970s and 1980s, with Zambia re-privatizing the mines in 1998.
The 2010 Research Paper analyzed the rise of resource nationalism in Southern Africa, which continues to grow in intensity. For example, in the 2010 Research Paper, it was predicted that major changes would be taking place in Namibia's previously tranquil mining industry. In May 2011 the Namibian government acted, contrary to the expectations of some experts. Namibia's Mines and Energy
Minister Isak Katali announced that uranium, copper, gold, zinc and coal had been declared strategic minerals which were to be mined with the participation of the state-owned mining company, Epangelo.
The company would have least a 26 percent stake in companies that were mining strategic minerals.
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Epangelo was recently formed and has been severely under-capitalized, which has raised questions about how it would pay for its stakes.
South African Resource Nationalism
South African resource nationalism is set against the backdrop of a government that has not been able to deliver on many of its promises of employment and greater prosperity for the impoverished masses. South Africa's macroeconomic performance remains satisfactory but is undergoing stresses. shrank by an average of one percent a year, whereas the world's other top 20 mining-export countries grew by an average of five percent a year.
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The principal problem is that South Africa has suffered from the increasingly arbitrary role of the government and rising levels of political uncertainty, caused by a number of resource nationalist actions by the government and ruling party. Mining industry expert, Peter Leon points to five factors that have contributed to decline. These include "the upheaval of the previous minerals regulatory regime;" a "lack of regulatory certainty and maladministration" and a "flawed Black Economic Empowerment policy;" as well as the "spectre of mine nationalisation" and the "state-owned mining company." 14 The 2002 Mining Law in effect nationalized minerals and enabled the government to play a role in granting mining rights and created ownership and regulatory uncertainty. 15 The law included a "Mining Charter" that mandated a "black economic empowerment" (BEE) requirement of 26 percent ownership by black-owned companies. This requirement has created regulatory uncertainty and has been abused in several high-profile cases. 16 In 2007 the state-owned mining company, African Exploration, was revived and given exemptions from regulation in order to make it competitive with private companies. 17 Resources Minister Susan Shabangu, who said the gold and platinum sectors were the "enemy of workers" when it comes to mine accidents. 20 Mining industry experts point out that mine nationalization without compensation would mean that mineworkers would lose their pensions; therefore, the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) has opposed mine nationalization, whereas other COSATU leaders tend to support nationalization. Another resource nationalist proposal is to establish strategic mineral "exchanges" in which minerals would be stockpiled to ensure price stability and encourage greater "beneficiation" inside South Africa. 22 Mining industry experts have criticized proposals for mineral exchanges and compulsory beneficiation as uneconomic and unworkable. 23 In regard to South Africa, views of mining industry experts range from mildly optimistic to very pessimistic. The mild optimists have counted on the moderate wing of the ANC to forestall resource nationalism and perhaps even revive the mining industry. Several experts cling to this hope, based on the history of sound macroeconomic policies since 1994. 24 It is significant that the Minister of Mining Resources, Susan Shabangu, and the Minister for Public Enterprises, Malusi Gigaba, have come out against nationalization. 25 Also, the suspension of Julius Malema from the ANC for five years has robbed the ANC Youth League of its most prominent nationalization proponent.
Pessimists point out that the 2002 Mining Law, the de facto nationalization of minerals, and the Mining Charter opened the door to political interference in the mining economy, which was followed by BEE abuses and calls for mine nationalization. In spite of the abuses, the government continues to push ahead with transformation of the mining industry. Malema and others have been scaring away investors with talk of nationalization. One mining investment expert referred to the nationalization push, the state mining company and other government actions as "death by a thousand cuts." 26 Since there is little or no capital for nationalization, wholesale takeovers can only be achieved largely without compensation. Otherwise, nationalization will be piecemeal. 27 Severe pessimists believe that nationalization of the mines in South Africa is inevitable. Their position is reflective of a broader unease with the direction that South Africa has been heading, especially over the last three years of the Zuma administration. 28 The likely outcome is somewhere in between the status quo and nationalization. President Zuma is determined to be reelected in April 2014; some suspect that the mining sector might be the sacrificial lamb to help him achieve his objective. It is possible that nationalization will not be wholesale; some mines may be nationalized, and some will not. The South African government is looking at Brazil as a model for increasing tax rates on the mining industry; since by Latin American standards, the South African mining sector is under-taxed. 29 Whatever is done, it is likely that resource nationalism will continue to concern foreign investors, who will remain reluctant to invest in South Africa. Also, local investor confidence will continue to stagnate, and the supply of strategic minerals will not increase. The Fraser Institute's ranking of South Africa as a place to invest in mining exploration is likely to stagnate in the bottom quartile. 30 In the medium and long term, resource nationalism will continue to place downward pressure on South African mining industry. It will suppress the supply of strategic minerals and make the scramble for them more intense in the years and decades to come. African PGM mining companies (Zimplats in Zimbabwe), has invested $500 million in a platinum refinery in Zimbabwe. Additionally both Impala and Anglo Platinum have invested billions of dollars in platinum mining in Zimbabwe. 31 The reason is that the platinum ore is relatively close to the surface and less costly to mine than in South Africa. In response to the Indigenization Law, Aquarius and other mining companies have offered 26 percent local ownership and an amount equivalent to 25 percent ownership in social benefits. 32 However, Mugabe and his Indigenization minister have threatened to cancel the mining permits of Zimplats and others companies if they do not fully comply. 33 Chinese companies have been exempted from the law, which can be seen as part of Mugabe's "look east" policy. Also, the Zimbabwe government has announced that it is considering a ban on raw platinum exports, which would dramatically reduce the flow of PGMs from The range of views on the Zimbabwe mining industry extends from optimistic to very pessimistic. There are mining industry insiders who consider Mugabe's resource nationalism to be largely rhetoric. 35 Other optimists think that Mugabe's days are numbered. 36 Pessimists include the Fraser In regard to resource nationalism, a struggle has emerged between President Kabila and Katanga
Resource Nationalism in Zimbabwe
Governor Katumbi, who has constructed a power base and is well-regarded in some Western quarters.
This has spawned fears of instability in Katanga and a rising risk to cobalt production and supply.
Katanga Province has always been the more industrial and developed region of the country and experienced secessionist rebellions in the 1960s and 1970s. In the past, whenever there was friction between the central government in Kinshasa and the Katanga provincial government, the dictator Mobutu would order power cut from Inga Dam to the copper mines. Today, the issue revolves around revenues from mining in Katanga that flow to the capital, Kinshasa, and do not flow back to Katanga. 38 One mining executive with strong involvement in the DRC is concerned that these differences will boil over into conflict, which could seriously disrupt the supply of cobalt and copper to the world. 39 President Kabila has been reelected and is due to serve until 2016 and is likely to keep the pressure on Katanga. Tensions between Katanga and Kinshasa will continue, and a major escalation could threaten the supply of copper and cobalt.
The views of the DRC range from pessimistic to guardedly optimistic. Oddly, one very experienced mining industry entrepreneur is quite bearish on the DRC, while being exceedingly bullish on Zimbabwe. 40 The DRC will continue to witness government interference in the mining industry, which will continue to concern investors. The Chinese may be able to operate under conditions of uncertainty, but Western companies and investors find it daunting. As a result, more cobalt and copper will flow to China.
41

CHINESE DEMAND-DRIVEN ACTIVITIES AND STRATEGY FOR RESOURCE ACCESS 42
China has developed a strategy to secure guaranteed supplies of strategic minerals, including the widespread use of "off-take agreements" with governments and companies worldwide and the imposition of export controls on rare earths and other minerals that are critical for Chinese industries. In response to export controls on several strategic minerals, including those that come from Southern Africa, the World Trade Organization has brought cases against China. In 2007, China identified five strategic reserve minerals (including cobalt, copper, and manganese with heavy concentrations in Southern Africa). China launched a plan to stockpile 500,000 metric tons of manganese, 200,000 of copper, and 300 of cobalt; which amounted to 90-180 days of imports. The estimated cost of the stockpile was $2.7 billion. The stockpile plan is operational today and includes rare earth minerals. 43 China has been aggressively implementing its strategy for resource access in seeking mineral resources in Southern Africa. 44 Chinese state-owned and private companies operate in most every African state, and in Southern Africa, some have formed joint ventures with state-owned firms and "black empowerment" companies. China has used soft power in building infrastructure, roads and bridges in Southern Africa in exchange for gaining access to guaranteed supplies of strategic minerals. 45 China also takes a long-term view in regard to the expansion of mining activities into Southern Africa. 46 One problem that Chinese companies face is that they are more hierarchical than South African and Western companies. This basic cultural difference means that every Chinese decision goes up many ranks to the top and then down many ranks, no matter how minor the issue. This slows down Chinese takeover bids, especially in a competitive economy like South Africa's. 47 However, China's Jinchuan
Group competed with and eventually prevailed over Brazil's Vale in a more than $1 billion takeover bid for South Africa's Metorex, which had been heavily involved in mining copper and cobalt in Zambia and the DRC for more than three decades.
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The range of views of Chinese demand-driven activities in Southern Africa extends from very critical to positive. 49 Chinese demand-driven activities will in the long run mean that the flow of strategic minerals will head increasingly to China. Together with resource nationalism and poor infrastructure, US access to strategic minerals from Southern Africa will diminish and be threatened in the next ten to twenty years or so.
Chinese Activities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Ninety percent of China's cobalt comes from the DRC (Katanga Province) and Zambia (Copperbelt Province) (see the map in Appendix A); Chinese access to cobalt and copper has dried up in the rest of the world. 50 In 2008, China and the DRC (and Gecamines -the state mining company) made a $6 billion concession deal -called "Sicomines" -(originally it was a $9 billion deal that was reduced to $6 billion after an intervention by the International Monetary Fund) for more than 10 million metric tons of copper and more than 600,000 metric tons of cobalt. In terms of the effect on the supply of cobalt, the Chinese could eventually buy large amounts of copper, which could mean large amounts of cobalt flooding the market, which could depress the price and make it non-economic to mine cobalt. However, at the moment, demand for cobalt has been driving prices higher, with a short plateau in 2009 and 2010. On the other hand, instability in Katanga could disrupt production and threaten supply.
As part of the Sicomines deal, China is building a road network stretching for four thousand kilometers (2,400 miles) and a railway system spanning 3,200 kilometers (1,920 miles). This is a much needed development in a country the size of Western Europe and the second largest in Africa but with only two hundred kilometers (120 miles) of tarred road. The building of a transport network is of strategic importance to the Chinese. It will make it easy to transport the copper and cobalt from mines in the landlocked Katanga region to the coast. 53 The six billion dollar Chinese investment in the DRC has raised concerns, especially around environmental consequences and transparency issues. 54 A most notable part of the deal was China's demand that the DRC guarantee repayment of infrastructure investments should profits from mining project be insufficient. 55 A most notable part of the deal was China's demand that the DRC guarantee repayment of infrastructure investments should profits from mining project be insufficient. 56 Chinese investors complain about the lack of security in the DRC and about their own government not providing enough support. Initially the International Monetary Fund (IMF) indicated that it was not willing to continue a three year poverty reduction and growth program, if the DRC government was potentially beholden to China in terms of debt. There has also been criticism from those who fear that the government has, through this deal, found a way to line the pockets of government officials. There were concerns that Congolese negotiators did not have the necessary capacity to take on the Chinese negotiators, a perennial problem besetting African countries in all trade and economic talks. Civil society and other stakeholders in the DRC have expressed concern about the transparency of the deal and have complained that they were not consulted. 57 There is fear that the Chinese will not honor environmental protocols. A lot of environmental damage has already been done to the DRC by mining activities. Artisanal mining and small operators have already done huge damage by excavating sites without care for plant or animal life. Thus far, the DRC government has not been clear on environmental policies and has not enforced them, with the expectation that investors would assume the responsibility to protect the environment. 58 In conclusion,
China is guaranteeing its source of copper and cobalt and is undeterred by conditions in the DRC.
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Chinese Activities in Zimbabwe
In regard to strategic minerals, China and Chinese companies are heavily involved in ferrochrome production and export in Zimbabwe. 60 A Chinese company owns a majority share of the ferrochrome firm ZIMASCO, which exports large quantities of the metal to China. Also, Chinese companies are involved in the Marange diamond mine trade, which has been restricted until recently by the Kimberley "blood diamond" process.
China has long had an affinity with "liberation movement" regimes and has had an especially is a military coup, the pro-ZANU-PF generals will probably want to forge an even closer relationship with China, which could be to the detriment of Western interests.
In spite of the long Chinese relationship with ZANU-PF, China is active in Zimbabwe more for the minerals and less to support Robert Mugabe and his party. In the coming years, Chinese interest in Zimbabwe and its minerals will continue to grow and will attract both ZANU-PF and MDC governments.
In contrast, the United States and the West will have less influence.
Chinese Activities in South Africa
Chinese involvement in South Africa is growing but is not as pervasive and dominant as in other become South Africa's largest trading partner and a potential source of greater investment and aid. 65 China will continue to seek off-take agreements for South African minerals and will slowly penetrate into mining operations. However, Chinese companies will continue to encounter resistance from the South African government and competition from South African companies in attempting to take over or initiate mining operations.
Chinese Activities in Zambia
Zambia 
SUPPLY CONSTRAINTS: PHYSICAL AND HUMAN INFRASTRUCTURE PROBLEMS AND LABOR CHALLENGES
In the 2010 Research Paper, the problems of physical infrastructure, especially electricity, railways, and water in South Africa and the negative effect on mineral production were analyzed. This report provides more details and updates. One of the overriding problems has been poor management of state-run infrastructure companies. In South Africa, the state-run electricity utility, Eskom, has been badly managed.
This has resulted in poor planning and anticipation of power demand in the future. The railway and transportation state-owned company, Transnet, has been managed abysmally. This has meant the railway system has deteriorated and it is difficult to transport strategic minerals and other products for export. In addition, the road system is deteriorating because of the heavy trucks carrying minerals that the railways should have been transporting. Problems of mismanagement and infrastructure shortages are likely to continue for some time to come. 68 In Zimbabwe, Zambia and the DRC, infrastructure has been crumbling, and electricity is often There are those who think that electricity and physical infrastructure are the major problems in South Africa and other Southern African countries, although the rise of resource nationalism has added another major problem. Infrastructure problems will continue in South Africa and Southern Africa, which will mean sub-optimal production and export of strategic minerals and alloys. Combined with other factors, poor infrastructure could mean that at some stage the United States may not be able to obtain the minerals and alloys that it needs.
Human infrastructure is another problem, especially the lack of skills and the out-migration of skilled mining professional and the poor education system in South Africa and other states (Namibia, Zimbabwe, Zambia and DR Congo). This problem will continue to contribute to the decline of the mining industry in Southern Africa. Therefore, companies are likely to compensate by importing skilled labor from Asia and elsewhere.
Another supply constraint has been high and rising labor costs and strong unions in South Africa. 70 It is difficult to fire workers in South Africa. Poor management-labor relations have always existed, with management having the upper hand before 1994 and with labor on top afterwards. Since 1994, the situation for management and investors has deteriorated. In addition, government overregulation of mines, especially in overemphasizing safety, has shaken investor confidence and caused supply disruptions. The Fraser Institute and others think that labor and government over-regulation have contributed to South Africa's decline as a mining destination. 71 Labor costs and regulation in South Africa have caused decline in the mining industry and will continue to do so. 72 Talk of mine nationalization has been coupled with COSATU's demands for real wage rises without increases in productivity, which has dampened investor confidence. 73 Given labor problems, mechanization may be the answer; however, the prospects for the mechanization of PGMs are not good, given the geology in South Africa.
US POLICY AND SOUTHERN AFRICA MINERALS: WHAT SHOULD THE UNITED STATES DO?
US embassies in South Africa, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Namibia, and the DRC are tracking mining issues and trends. However, US officials are doing very little to negotiate with these governments on the challenges facing mining companies, investors and the free market for minerals. 74 The United States has relatively few resources available for Southern Africa to compete with the billions of dollars of Chinese aid and investment. Also, there are few US mining companies operating in Southern Africa. 75 China's strategy for resource access in southern Africa through ore for infrastructure deals has implications for "soft power" which the United States needs to understand and counteract. 76 One controversial measure that has hindered US involvement in the competition for Congolese minerals is the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, which restricts US access to minerals where conflict has been prevalent and which has helped shine a light on abuses in the DRC. In the past year, the act has forced some US companies out of the market for Congolese tungsten and tantalum, and Chinese companies have moved in and bought them cheaply. Also, the Dodd-Frank
Law is being imposed outside of eastern DRC conflict zones and in cobalt-rich Katanga Province where there is no conflict. 77 In Zambia, US embassy officials pointed out that Chinese investment in Zambia was more than $10 billion, while US investment was in the millions. 78 Therefore, the United States has limited leverage in Zambia, outside of its leadership of the IMF and World Bank.
In contrast to China, the United States has been employing soft power throughout the Southern African region by providing anti-retroviral (ARVs) medications and other assistance to fight HIV/AIDS.
This has helped to win hearts and minds.
One measure the United States might take to guarantee the supply of strategic minerals would be to work with partners (the EU, World Bank, China and others) to develop infrastructure -electricity, railroads, roads, water and dams as well as mining skills and other human infrastructure -all of which are important in expanding production and supply. A recent example was a loan from the US Ex-Im Bank to fund the development of a South African power station.
A high-risk, high-reward project that could dramatically expand production and supply of minerals is the Inga Dam project. At present, international efforts are assisting the DRC to regenerate phases I&II, which were dramatically reduced during the civil war from 1996 to 2005. The United States and its international partners could also assist with Phase III and Grand Inga. Once completed, Inga and
Grand Inga could supply all of Africa's electricity and permit the expansion of the production of strategic minerals and metals. 79 However, given the Congolese government's questionable behavior towards First
Quantum and other companies, risk is involved in investing in Inga and other large-scale projects. A stepby-step approach might work better, first with the revamping of the national electricity company and second with the restoration of Phases I&II to full capacity. African pension funds could provide part of the needed investment. 
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A new beneficiation law has been passed which means that the South African government will support processing, smelting and manufacturing of metals in the country. 83 In regard to "beneficiation," officials in South Africa's Department of Trade and Industry and South African industries have expressed preference for all five stages of processing, smelting and manufacturing of metal to be developed inside the country. However, there are major challenges for ferroalloy and PGM beneficiation, especially ESKOM electricity shortages and South Africa's impending laws against climate change limiting greenhouse gas emissions. Also, the financial sector would rather support the exporting of ore rather than further beneficiation, which is not profitable. It would be better for the United States to assist in the development of infrastructure to expand supply than assist costly and unprofitable beneficiation in order to ensure long term access to strategic metals. 84 Other measures the United States could take include negotiating off-take agreements with South 86 Also, the US government could step up diplomatic efforts to dissuade the ANC from moving towards nationalization.
In the DRC, the United States will continue to work with the IMF, the EU and other partners to and that the MDC will assume power.
However, the United States must be on guard against the possibility of a coup by Mugabe's security forces, another spiral of degeneration, and turn towards dependence on China. Zimbabwe has suffered a collapsed economy, is a failed state, and will take years to rebuild, even if the MDC takes power in 2012. 87 Thus, the United States must be prepared for a range of possibilities.
US INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND STRATEGIC MINERALS
For years now, the lack of a US industrial policy including strategic minerals has hampered efforts to guarantee the supply of minerals and could be damaging in the future. However, China's monopoly of and export controls on rare earth minerals have spurred moves towards an industrial policy that guarantees access to those minerals. The rare earths crisis that China inflicted on Japan in late 2010 gave rise to new policy measures. 88 Japan, 89 A US Geological Survey minerals expert commented that the problem with information-sharing is that "the USGS collects proprietary data from US companies on mineral and metal production and consumption that should not be compromised. The aggregated data is important to national security planning and since only that data are published by the USGS, companies' confidential data are not compromised." 94 He observed that there is the need for consensus about potential mineral issues, thereby "reducing the potential for an international misunderstanding or counter-productive interdepartmental bickering over which mineral is more important." He commented that "the problem with US government contractors sharing raw materials data with the Department of Defense is that a contractor may not know what raw materials go into a weapon system."
95
The minerals expert commented that it would serve US national security "to have complete and accurate information about national mineral and metal production and consumption for security, strategic planning, and stockpiling analysts to work with. Complete collection of such information would be greatly aided by requiring companies in the DoD and Department of Energy supply chain to report mineral and metal production and consumption to the USGS as a condition in accepting government contracts..." 96 The expert concluded that there are "tensions between security and the economic interests of business and industry. Maximizing profits may lead to supporting limited sources of raw materials that could result in supply chain vulnerability and reduced security. Is that issue best addressed at the point of supply (policies that support mining) or at the point of consumption (policies that encourage consumers to support production diversity in the supply chain)? Another situation might occur when a company needs a raw material that is supply-limited to produce its defense-related and commercial equipment. Privileged access based on defense contracts could be abused to acquire materials for commercial production or to limit availability to a competitor." 97 In sum, the United States should pursue an industrial policy concerning strategic minerals; however, there are numerous pitfalls in constructing and implementing such a policy that must be taken into account.
One fundamental problem is that China has been manufacturing more over the decades, and the United States has been manufacturing less, which does not bode well for US defense industries. The
United States may eventually be unable to manufacture "defense critical" items, even if it is able to maintain access to strategic minerals. Therefore, the United States will either have to depend on China for metals and defense critical components or be forced to dismantle weapons systems. If the United States takes dramatic actions to reconstitute defense critical manufacturing and secure strategic minerals, the long-term crisis might be avoided.
In regard to issues about defense critical resources, it is possible for them to be forecasted and monitored, regulated and managed, and moderated to avoid or mitigate potential conflict. The United
States, its allies, China and others could work together to identify future demand trends and work with Southern African suppliers to identify future sources of competition and conflict. Long-term sustainability practices could be developed and implemented in areas of critical resource distribution, including the development of alternative materials that do not use PGMs; for instance, the switch to electric cars could mean a phasing out of catalytic converters. Aggressive recycling could work for some strategic minerals but not for others.
FUTURE CONFLICT OVER STRATEGIC MINERALS AND THE ROLE OF THE US MILITARY
Future areas of conflict over strategic resources in Southern Africa will be concentrated in Chinese efforts to monopolize PGMs, chromium, manganese and cobalt and Southern African regime efforts to nationalize mining industries and make large off-take deals with China and other Asian nations.
New battlegrounds may emerge over strategic resources in Southern Africa in the next twenty years or so.
Southern Africa is a potential battleground, given the high concentration of certain strategic resources in the region and rising resource nationalism and encroachment of China.
The United States must prepare for conflict in attempting to compel China to not monopolize strategic minerals and Southern African regimes not to nationalize them and not divert resources away from the United States. One way to stop Chinese monopolistic behavior and biased, excessive Southern
African off-take agreements would be to use the US Navy to block the shipment of minerals. While China is gaining greater access in Africa, the United States has the upper hand because the resources have to be transported from Southern Africa through the Indian Ocean and Strait of Malacca to Chinese ports. The
Chinese response could involve their navy attempting to defeat the US Navy; the "string of pearls" that China is developing could eventually help to offset US supremacy. 98 Southern African states could attempt to keep the United States out of the sub-region and withhold strategic minerals from the United States. In such a case, the United States may have to intervene in the sub-region. At the moment, these scenarios seem far-fetched and may never occur.
However, from the 2020s onwards, the likelihood of conflict will exist. 99 At issue is how US agencies might adjust to the forthcoming challenges. The US National Security Council, DOD and US Africa Command (AFRICOM) might develop contingencies to deal with the eventual prospect of resource cutoffs and the possibility of conflict over strategic minerals. The United States also continues to apply sanctions against President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe and his inner circle, which makes building mil-to-mil partnerships with the SADC difficult. In addition, there is some resistance to US foreign policy and AFRICOM from the Kabila regime in the DRC, the SWAPO government in Namibia, and the dos Santos regime in Angola. By the 2020s, US intervention might be needed to ensure sustained US and allied access to Southern African strategic minerals, which means that the building of strategic partnerships in the next decade is important. Building partnerships with Southern African countries will continue to be difficult, and AFRICOM could become an increasingly important player in this challenging process. Finally, the formulation and execution of a sound strategic communications plan is important to moderate Chinese involvement and ensure sustained access to Southern African mineral resources.
CONCLUSION
This report has demonstrated that resource nationalism and Chinese demand-driven activities are two main factors which may restrict US access to strategic minerals in Southern Africa. In particular, China is establishing dominance over the supply of strategic minerals through off-take agreements and through entering the mining industries in the DRC, Zimbabwe and Zambia. In contrast, Chinese efforts to enter the South African mining industry are being resisted by the South African government. Instead, Chinese companies are able to secure off-take agreements for strategic minerals. This will mean that Chinese efforts to monopolize PGMs and ferroalloys from South Africa will be accomplished through off-take agreements rather than through joint ventures. In any event, Chinese demand-driven activities pose a long-term threat to the supply of strategic minerals to the United States. Greater attention to this matter today will prevent a greater expenditure of blood and treasure in the future.
